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1Security Enhancement Using a Novel Two-Slot
Cooperative NOMA Scheme 
 
Abstract—In this letter, we propose a novel cooperative non-
orthogonal multiple access (NOMA) scheme to guarantee the se-
cure transmission of a specific user via two time slots. During the
first time slot, the base station (BS) transmits the superimposed
signal to the first user and the relay via NOMA. Meanwhile,
the signal for the first user is also decoded at the second user
from the superimposed signal due to its high transmit power. In
the second time slot, the relay forwards the signal to the second
user while the BS retransmits the signal for the first user as
interference to disrupt the eavesdropping. Due to the fact that
the second user has obtained the signal for the first user in the
first slot, the interference can be eliminated at the second user.
To measure the performance of the proposed cooperative NOMA
scheme, the outage probability for the first user and the secrecy
outage probability for the second user are analyzed. Simulation
results are presented to show the effectiveness of the proposed
scheme.
Index Terms—Artificial noise, non-orthogonal multiple access,
physical layer security, relay, secrecy outage probability.
I. INTRODUCTION
Non-orthogonal multiple access (NOMA) can improve spec-
trum efficiency, reduce latency and support massive connec-
tivity, which has attracted great attention [1], [2]. In NOMA
networks, the receivers are allocated with different transmit
power depending on their channel conditions, and the received
signals are decoded at each receiver via successive interference
cancellation (SIC).
Recently, cooperative NOMA has been widely studied to
extend the coverage for NOMA [3]–[7]. In [3], the cooperative
NOMA broadcasting/multicasting scheme was proposed by
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Liu et al. to achieve low-latency and high-reliability for V2X
in 5G networks. A two-stage secondary NOMA relay assisted
spectrum sharing scheme was proposed by Chen et al. in [4].
In [5], Liu et al. proposed an optimal power allocation scheme
to maximize the global energy efficiency in a cooperative
NOMA system. The cooperative NOMA system was proposed
by Liu et al. to provide wireless transmission for two far users
with decode-and-forward relaying in [6]. In [7], some excellent
work was done by Jiao et al. to analyze the performance of
cooperative NOMA networks over Rician fading channels.
Although NOMA plays an important role in improving
spectrum efficiency, communication security in NOMA net-
works remains challenging [8]–[15]. In [9], Feng et al. de-
veloped a novel beamforming design with the aid of artificial
noise to ensure the security of NOMA system. The secure
cooperative NOMA scheme was proposed by Lv et al. in
[10], in which jamming is leveraged to disrupt the untrusted
relay via beamforming and adapting the rate. In [11], Chen
et al. proposed a secure primary transmission scheme, which
is guaranteed by a secondary full-duplex NOMA relay. The
secrecy outage probability was derived by Lei et al. in [12]
for NOMA networks with max-min transmit antenna selection.
In [13], Cao et al. considered the security of a two-user
cooperative NOMA system, in which the secrecy outage
probability of the two users was analyzed. Tradeoff was made
between the reliability and security by Li et al. of cooperative
NOMA in cognitive radio networks [14].
Motivated by the above works, we propose a two-slot
cooperative NOMA scheme in this paper. First, the BS sends
superimposed signals to the first user (U1) and the relay via
NOMA. U2 decodes the high-power signal of U1 and stores
it locally. Then, the relay performs transmission for U2, while
the BS transmits the signal of U1 to disrupt the eavesdropping.
Since U2 has obtained the signal for U1, the interference can
be eliminated at U2. To further analyze the performance of
U1 and U2, the outage probability (OP) of U1 and the secrecy
outage probability (SOP) of U2 are derived.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
Consider a cooperative NOMA network as shown in Fig.
1, with a BS, a relay, two users of U1 and U2, and an
eavesdropper. Assume that U2 requires secure transmission1.
Each node is equipped with a single antenna and works in a
1This is reasonable when U1 is a secondary user and U2 is a primary user
in a cognitive radio network. The secondary user U1 can only access the
licensed spectrum if it can help U1 to achieve secure transmission.
2Fig. 1. Demonstration of the two-slot cooperative NOMA scheme.
half-duplex mode. The channels follow Rayleigh fading. The
transmit power of BS and relay is denoted as PB and PR,
respectively. Denote the transmitted signals for U1 and U2
as x1 and x2, respectively, and the eavesdropper only intends
to intercept x2. The distances from the BS to the relay, U1,
and U2 can be denoted as dBR, dB1 and dB2, respectively,
satisfying dBR < dB1 < dB2. Thus, the average channel gain
can be ordered as E
jhBRj2 > E jhB1j2 > E jhB2j2,
where hBR =
q
d BRgBR, hB1 =
q
d B1 gB1 and hB2 =q
d B2 gB2 are the channel gains from the BS to the relay, U1,
and U2, respectively. gBR, gB1 and gB2 are the corresponding
Rayleigh fading coefficients,  is the path-loss exponent, and
 is the path loss at the reference distance 1 m.
Due to the weak channel strength from the BS to U2, the
security of U2 is threatened2. To guarantee the security of U2,
we propose a cooperative NOMA scheme with two time slots,
which will be demonstrated in the next section.
III. COOPERATIVE NOMA SCHEME
In this section, we propose a novel cooperative NOMA
scheme with two time slots as follows.
A. First Time Slot
In the first time slot, the superimposed signals of x1 and x2
are sent to the relay and U1 via NOMA. U1 decodes x1, and
relay decodes x1 and x2 with SIC. Perfect SIC is considered
because the interference cancellation is performed only once.
In addition, U2 decodes x1 and stores it locally. The received
signal at U1 can be expressed as
yB1 =
p
P1hB1x1 +
p
P2hB1x2 + n1; (1)
where P1 = 1PB and P2 = 2PB are the transmit power
allocated to x1 and x2. 1 and 2 are the power allocation
coefficients for x1 and x2, satisfying 1 > 2 and 1+2 =
1. n1 is the additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) with zero
mean and variance 2 at U1. Thus, the received SINR for x1
at U1 can be expressed as
SINR11 =
P1jhB1j2
P2jhB1j2 + 2 : (2)
The received signal at the relay can be obtained as
yBR =
p
P1hBRx1 +
p
P2hBRx2 + nr; (3)
2If U2 is closer to the BS than U1, the security of U2 can be easily satisfied
via NOMA due to its lower transmit power.
where nr is the AWGN with zero mean and variance 2 at
the relay. Thus, the received SINR at the relay to decode x1
and x2 can be written as
SINRR1 =
P1jhBRj2
P2jhBRj2 + 2 ; (4)
SINRR2 =
P2jhBRj2
2
: (5)
In the first time slot, U2 will try to decode x1 and store it
locally, and the received signal at U2 can be obtained as
yB2 =
p
P1hB2x1 +
p
P2hB2x2 + n2; (6)
where n2 is the AWGN with zero mean and variance 2 at
U2. Thus, the received SINR at U2 to decode x1 and x2 can
be denoted as
SINR21 =
P1jhB2j2
P2jhB2j2 + 2 ; (7)
SINR22 =
P2jhB2j2
2
: (8)
SINR22 in (8) is very small and can be ignored because the
distance from BS to U2 is the longest.
The received signal at the eavesdropper can be obtained as
yBE =
p
P1hBEx1 +
p
P2hBEx2 + ne; (9)
where ne is the AWGN with zero mean and variance 2 at
the eavesdropper. The received SINR at the eavesdropper to
decode x2 in the first time slot can be denoted as
SINR
[1]
E2 =
P2jhBE j2
P1jhBE j2 + 2 : (10)
B. Second Time Slot
In the second time slot, the relay transmits x2 to U2, while
the BS transmits x1 to disrupt the eavesdropping. Thus, the
eavesdropper receives x2 from the relay and the interference
of x1 from the BS as
y
[2]
E =
p
PBhBEx1 +
p
PRhREx2 + ne: (11)
The received SINR at the eavesdropper to decode x2 in the
second time slot can be obtained as
SINR
[2]
E2 =
PRjhRE j2
PB jhBE j2 + 2 : (12)
Using (10) and (12), we can obtain the overall eavesdropping
rate of the two slots towards x2 by using the maximal-ratio
combining (MRC) as3
RE =
1
2
log2

1 + SINR
[1]
E2 + SINR
[2]
E2

: (13)
On the other hand, if U2 can successfully decode x1 in the
first time slot, the interference of x1 in the second time slot
can be perfectly eliminated at U2, and the received SINR at
U2 for x2 can be denoted as
SINR221 =
PRjhR2j2
2
: (14)
3The full CSI is not used to perform the proposed scheme, and it is only
used in the performance analysis.
3Based on (5) and (14), the transmission rate of U2 can be
expressed as
R21 =
1
2
log2 (1 + min[SINRR2; SINR221]) : (15)
Thus, the secrecy rate of x2 can be obtained as
Rs1 = [R21  RE ]+; (16)
where [x]+ , max(x; 0).
If U2 fails to decode x1 in the first time slot, the received
SINR at U2 for x2 can be denoted as
SINR222 =
PRjhR2j2
PBjhB2j2 + 2 ; (17)
and the transmission rate of U2 can be expressed as
R22 =
1
2
log2 (1 + min[SINRR2; SINR222]) : (18)
Thus, the secrecy rate of x2 can be obtained as
Rs2 = [R22  RE ]+: (19)
IV. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
In this section, we will analyze the OP for U1 and the SOP
for U2.
A. Outage Probability for U1
According to (2) and (4), the transmission rate of U1 can
be denoted as
R1 =
1
2
log2 (1 + min[SINRR1; SINR11]) : (20)
Then, the OP of U1 can be expressed as
Pr1 = Pr(R1 < r1); (21)
where r1 is the rate threshold of x1. To simplify the expression,
we define S = jhBRj2;K = jhB1j2 and a = 1
2
P1 1P2 ; where
S and K follow the exponential distribution with parameters
s = 1=(d
 
BR) and k = 1=(d
 
B1 ), respectively. Hence,
the cumulative density function (CDF) of S and K can be
calculated as FS(s) = 1  e ss and FK(k) = 1  e kk, re-
spectively. The probability density function (PDF) of S and K
can be calculated as fS(s) = se ss and fK(k) = ke kk,
respectively. Define 1 = 22r1   1 as the SINR threshold of
x1. The OP for U1 can be obtained in Proposition 1.
Proposition 1: When P1   1P2  0, Pr1 = 1. Otherwise,
the OP for U1 can be expressed as
Pr1 = 1  e (s+k)a: (22)
Proof: (21) is equivalent to
Pr1 = Pr(min[SINRR1; SINR11] < 1): (23)
When P1 1P2  0, we can obtain (P1 1P2)S < 12
and (P1   1P2)K < 12, that is SINRR1 < 1 and
SINR11 < 1. Thus, Pr1 = Pr(min[SINRR1; SINR11] <
1) = 1.
When P1   1P2 > 0, (23) can be simplified as Pr1 =
Pr(S  a; S  K) + Pr(K  a;K  S):
Due to the independence between S and K, Pr(S  a; S 
K) =
R a
0
fS(s)ds
R +1
s
fK(k)dk =
R a
0
fS(s)(1   FK(s)) =R a
0
se
 (s+k)sds = ss+k (1  e (s+k)a).
Similarly, we can get Pr(K  a;K  S) = ks+k (1  
e (s+k)a). Thus, we have Pr1 = Pr(S  a; S  K) +
Pr(K  a;K  S) = 1  e (s+k)a:
B. Secrecy Outage Probability for U2
The SOP of U2 can be expressed as
Pr2 = Pr (SINRR1 < 1)| {z }
I1
+ Pr (SINRR1 > 1; Rs1 < r2) Pr (SINR21 > 1)| {z }
I2
+ Pr (SINRR1 > 1; SINR21 < 1; Rs2 < r2)| {z }
I3
;
(24)
where r2 is the rate threshold of x2.
To simplify the expression, we define V = SINR221; L =
jhR2j2; J = jhB2j2; T1 = SINR[1]E2; T2 = SINR[2]E2; T = T1 +
T2, and b = P1(P1 1P2)22r2   1; where V , L and J follow the
exponential distribution with parameters v = 2=(d R2PR),
l = 1=(d
 
R2 ) and j = 1=(d
 
B2 ), respectively. dR2 is the
distance from the relay to U2. Thus, the CDF of V , L and J
can be calculated as FV (v) = 1   e vv, FL(l) = 1   e ll
and FJ (j) = 1  e jj , respectively. The PDF of V , L and J
can be calculated as fV (v) = ve vv , fL(l) = le ll and
fJ(j) = je
 jj , respectively. The PDF of T1 and T2 can be
calculated as
fT1(t1) =
8<:
P2
21
(P2   P1t1)2 e
 t121
P2 P1t1 ; t1 < P2=P1;
0; t1  P2=P1;
(25)
fT2(t2)=(1+2)e
 2t22

2
2t2+1
+
1
(2t2+1)2

; (26)
where 1 = 1=(d BE) and 2 = 1=(d
 
RE) are param-
eters of the exponential distribution of jhBE j2 and jhRE j2,
respectively. dBE and dRE are the distance from the BS
to the eavesdropper and the distance from the relay to the
eavesdropper, respectively. Due to T1  0, T2  0 and
T1+T2 = T , we can obtain that 0  T1  T . Thus, according
to the independence between T1 and T2, we can obtain the
PDF of T as
fT (t) =
Z t
0
fT1(t1)fT2(t  t1)dt1: (27)
The accurate solution to (27) is difficult to calculate. Using
the Chebyshev-Guass quadrature, we can get an approximate
of PDF for T as
fT (t) =
Z t
0
fT1(t1)fT2(t  t1)dt1
 t
2L
LX
l=1
q
1 x2l fT1

t
2
xl+
t
2

fT2

t
2
  t
2
xl

;
(28)
where L is the number of Gauss-Chebyshev nodes, and xl =
cos( 2l 12L ).
4When P1   1P2  0, Pr2 can be given as Proposition 2.
Proposition 2: When P1   1P2  0, Pr2 = 1.
Proof: When P1   1P2  0, we can obtain that (P1  
1P2)S < 1
2, i.e., SINRR1 < 1. Thus, we can obtain
I1 = 1, I2 = I3 = 0 and Pr2 = 1.
When P1 1P2 > 0, I1, I2 and I3 are discussed as follows.
(1) Calculation of I1
I1 can be calculated as
I1 = FS(a) = 1  e sa: (29)
(2) Calculation of I2
Pr (SINRR1 > 1; Rs1 < r2) can be expressed as
Pr (SINRR1 > 1; Rs1 < r2)
= Pr

T > b; a < S < g1(T ); V >
P2S
2

| {z }
I21
+ Pr

V <
P2a
2
; T > g2(V )

Pr(S > a)| {z }
I22
+ Pr

V >
P2a
2
; T > g2(V ); S >
V 2
P2

| {z }
I23
;
(30)
where g1(T ) =
 
22r2(1 + T )  12=P2 and g2(V ) =
V+1
22r2
  1.
I21 can be calculated as
I21 =
Z 1
b
fT (t)dt
Z g1(t)
a
fS(s)ds
Z 1
P2s
2
fV (v)dv
=
Z 1
b
h1(t)dt;
(31)
where h1(t) =
fT (t)s
a2
(ea2g1(t)   ea2a) and a2 =  (s +
vP2=
2). Due to the fact that (31) is convergent, we can
approximate (31) as
I21 
Z D
b
h1(t)dt; (32)
where D denotes a sufficiently large positive number. Then,
we can use Gauss-Chebyshev quadrature to yield its approxi-
mation as
I21 (D   b)
2L
LX
l=1
q
1  x2l h1

D   b
2
xl +
D + b
2

: (33)
Similarly, we can obtain the approximate solutions to I22 and
I23 as
I22 
Z P2a
2
0
h2(v)dv (1  FS(a))
 P2a
2L2
LX
l=1
q
1 x2l h2

P2a
22
xl+
P2a
22

(1  FS(a));
(34)
where
h2(v) =fV (v)
(D   g2(v))
2L
LX
l=1
q
1  x2l
fT

D   g2(v)
2
xl +
D + g2(v)
2

:
(35)
I23 
Z 1
P2a
2
h3(v)dv
 (D 
P2a
2 )
2L
LX
l=1
q
1 x2lh3
 
D  P2a2
2
xl +
D + P2a2
2
!
;
(36)
where
h3(v) =fV (v)

1  FS

v2
P2

(D   g2(v))
2L
LX
l=1
q
1  x2l fT

D g2(v)
2
xl+
D+g2(v)
2

:
(37)
From (7), we can easily get
Pr (SINR21 > 1) = 1  FJ (a): (38)
From (33), (34), (36) and (38), I2 can be expressed as
I2 = (I21 + I22 + I23)(1  FJ(a)): (39)
(3) Calculation of I3
I3 can be calculated as
I3 = Pr (a < S < g1(T ); J < a; L > g3(S; J))| {z }
I31
+ Pr (a < S < g1(T ); J < a; L < g3(S; J))| {z }
I32
+ Pr (T > b; S > g1(T ); J < a; L < g4(T; J))| {z }
I33
+ Pr (T < b; S > a; J < a; L < g4(T; J))| {z }
I34
;
(40)
where g3(S; J) =
P2S(PBJ+
2)
PR2
and g4(T; J) =
g1(T )P2(PBJ+
2)
PR2
. The approximate solutions to I31, I32,
I33 and I34 can be expressed as follows.
I31 
Z 1
b
h4(t)dt
 (D   b)
2L
LX
l=1
q
1  x2l h4

D   b
2
xl +
D + b
2

;
(41)
where
h4(t) =fT (t)
(g1(t)  a)
2L
LX
l=1
q
1  x2l
g5

g1(t)  a
2
xl +
g1(t) + a
2
 (42)
and
g5(s) = fS(s)je
 lP2s
PR
1  e (j+
lP2PBS
PR
2 )a
j +
lP2PBS
PR2
: (43)
I32 
Z 1
b
h5(t)dt
 (D   b)
2L
LX
l=1
q
1  x2l h5

D   b
2
xl +
D + b
2

;
(44)
5where
h5(t) =fT (t)
(g1(t)  a)
2L
LX
l=1
q
1  x2l
g6

g1(t)  a
2
xl +
g1(t) + a
2
 (45)
and
g6(s) = FJ(a)fS(s)  g5(s): (46)
I33 
Z 1
b
h6(t)dt
 (D   b)
2L
LX
l=1
q
1  x2l h6

D   b
2
xl +
D + b
2

;
(47)
where
h6(t) =fT (t)(1  FS(g1(t)))g7(t) (48)
and
g7(t) = FJ(a) je
 lg1(t)P2
PR
1  e (j+
lg1(t)P2PB
PR
2 )a
j +
lg1(t)P2PB
PR2
: (49)
I34 
Z b
0
h7(t)dt(1  FS(a))
 b
2L
LX
l=1
q
1  x2l h7

b
2
xl +
b
2

;
(50)
where
h7(t) =fT (t)g7(t): (51)
Therefore, when P1   1P2 > 0, according to (29), (39)
and (40), we can obtain Pr2 as
Pr2 = 1  e sa + (I21 + I22 + I23)(1  FJ (a))
+ I31 + I32 + I33 + I34:
(52)
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
In the simulation, we set PB = PR = P . The distance from
the BS to the relay, the eavesdropper, U1 and U2 is dbr=30 m,
dbe=40 m, db1=60 m and db2=70 m, respectively. The distance
from the relay to the eavesdropper and U2 is dre=40 m, dr2=60
m, respectively. The noise power is 2 =  110 dBm.  = 3
and  = 10 4. The rate threshold of x1 and x2 is set to
r1 = r2 = 0:5 bit/s/Hz, and thus, the SINR threshold of x1
can be calculated as 1 = 22r1   1 = 1.
First, the OP of U1 and SOP of U2 in the proposed
scheme and the conventional NOMA scheme are compared
in Fig. 2 for different values of P when the power allocation
coefficient for x1 is 1=0.8. In addition, in the conventional
NOMA scheme, 1 denotes the power allocation coefficient
for x2. From the results, we can see that the SOP of U2
in the conventional NOMA scheme is close to 1 due to
the high transmit power allocated to x2, which gives great
threat to the security of U2. On the contrary, in the proposed
scheme, the SOP of U2 is low, and the security of U2 can be
guaranteed. This is because in the first time slot, the transmit
power allocated to x2 is low, and in the second time slot,
the BS transmits x1 to disrupt the eavesdropping towards x2.
Furthermore, the OP of U1 in the proposed scheme is lower
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Fig. 2. Comparison of OP for U1 and SOP for U2 for different values of
P when 1=0.8 in different schemes.
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Fig. 3. Comparison of OP for U1 and SOP for U2 for different values of
1 when P=5 mW.
than that of the conventional NOMA scheme, because in the
proposed scheme, U1 is allocated with a higher transmit power
in the first time slot, while in the conventional NOMA scheme,
U1 is a weak user allocated with a lower transmit power.
Besides, we can also see that the SOP of U2 and the OP of U1
decrease with P in the proposed scheme. This is because both
of the transmit power of x2 and x1 increases, which results in
the increasing of the transmission rate of x1 and x2 with the
eavesdropping rate towards x2 almost unchanged. In addition,
the theoretical OP of U1 and SOP of U2 are consistent with
the simulation results.
Then, the OP of U1 and SOP of U2 in the proposed scheme
and the conventional NOMA scheme are compared in Fig. 3
for different values of 1 when P=5 mW. From the results,
we can observe that the security of U2 can be significantly
improved with different values of 1 via the proposed scheme
compared to the conventional NOMA scheme, and the OP
of U1 in the proposed scheme is lower than that of the
conventional NOMA scheme. Besides, we can also see that the
SOP of U2 decreases first and then increases with 1. This is
because when 1 is small, x1 cannot be decoded correctly to
6recover x2 at the relay; when 1 is large, the transmit power
allocated to x2 is so small that its rate requirement cannot be
satisfied. Moreover, the OP of U1 decreases with 1, due to the
fact that higher transmit power allocated to x1 will increase its
transmission rate. In addition, the theoretical and simulation
results are consistent with each other.
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we have proposed a two-slot cooperative
NOMA scheme with two users and a potential eavesdropper.
First, superimposed signals are sent to U1 and the relay by
BS. U2 decodes the high-power signal of U1 and caches it
locally. Then, the relay transmits the signal to U2, while the BS
transmits the signal of U1 to disrupt the eavesdropping. Due to
the fact that U2 has obtained the signal for U1, the interference
can be eliminated. To further analyze the performance of
U1 and U2, the OP of U1 and the SOP of U2 are derived.
Simulation results are presented to verify the derivation of OP
and SOP, and show the effectiveness of the proposed scheme.
In our future work, artificial jamming will be introduced to
further improve the security when both users require secure
transmission or the eavesdropper can detect multi-user data.
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